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Following World War I, the rights of nationalities living in other 
countries were guaranteed by the so called minority treaties, in addition 
to the jieace treaties, forming part of the general arrangements. While 
the peace treaties made with the defeated states contained nationality- 
protecting paragraphs, some of the victorious states, such as Czechoslo­
vakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia guaranteed the free development of 
minorities living in their country through special international agree­
ments. As a result, the nationality qestion became not only a question of 
home policy but a matter of foreign affairs as well. The treaty regulating 
the rights of the nationalities in Czechoslovakia was signed bv the latter 
and the Powers of the Entente at Saint-Germain-en-Lave on September 
10, 1919.1
The makers of the peace system of Versailles had to effect the correc­
tions expressed in the minority treaties for compensating the violation 
of the principle of free self-determination. At the peace conference, this 
system of minority protection was insisted upon by the delegation of the 
United States, by President Wilson first of all; its practical implemen­
tation was carried out by France2.
This system affected mainly the states wich had large German and 
Hungarian nationalities. I t was Czechoslovakia wich belonged to these 
states first of all. The problem the new Republic had to cope with con­
sisted not in denying the minorities these possiblities, although, as we 
shall see, various attempts were made to curtail these rights as far as 
possible. The greatest danger was that Germany and Hungary, on the 
basis of this contract and on the pretext of protecting the Germans and 
Hungarians — for wich bourgeois Czeshoslovakia often gave occasion, to 
be sure - would interfere with the country ’s affairs with the aid of the 
League of Nations, with the domestic affairs of a country whose t xistencc 
they called into doubt and whose crushing they were seeking.
What did this treaty of Saint Germain contain ? First and foremost, 
Czechoslovakia undertook not to pass statues, decrees or measures aga­
inst the nationality rights outlined in the treaty. (Article 1.). As concerns 
concrete regulation, the starting-point was this: ,,La Tehćeo-Slovaquie
s’engage à accorder à tous les habitants pleine et entière protection de 
leur vie et de leur liberté sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de 
langage, de race ou de religion“. (Art. 2)3. Here we must call attention to 
the fact that personal liberty was due not only to the citizens of Czecho­
slovakia, but to all inhabitants o fth a t country alike. We must pay atten­
tion to this because — as we shall see — the treaty made substantial 
distinctions between the inhabitants of the country and Czechoslovak 
citizens.
Articles 3 — 6 regulated exactly this question. Czechoslovak citizen­
ship was granted to all individuals, without any formality and automatic­
ally, whose registered domicile belonged to the territory of Czechoslo­
vakia. The same applied, in the second place, to all persons who were 
born in this territory, to those whose parents had their registered domicile 
in Czechoslovakia, even if they were not residents of Czechoslovakia at the 
time when the treaty came into force. In the third place, the mere fact of 
having been born in Czechoslovakia guaranteed citizenship validly to 
all to whom no other citizenship was due by virtue of birth. At the same 
time these persons had the right of option (after the age of 18, and with 
the wife’s status following the husband’s), i. e. could claim other citizen­
ship open to them4.
The third type of acquiring citizenship was conditional on the app­
roval of the victorious state. This form was not contained in the treaty of 
Saint Germain, but was regulate din the Peace Treaty of Trianon. Accord­
ing to the pertinent paragraphs, those who acquired registration of 
domicile after January 1st, 1910, in a territory that belonged to Czecho­
slovakia later on, were granted citizenship only with the consent of the 
Republic. This right of consent was due only to the victorious states5.
We had to discuss the problems of citizenship in some detail because 
subsequent paragraphs guaranteed nationality rights only to citizens of 
the state, and this amounted to a certain restriction in itself. This is the 
ease also — as we shall see — with several bourgeois-democratic and 
nationality rights laid down in the Czechoslovak constitution and lan­
guage acts.
In certain respects, the treaty of Saint Germain recognized also the 
collective right of minorities; this applied to the full extent to the Carpath­
ian Ukraine, where the Ukrainians were granted territorial autonomy 
(Art. 10—13)° which, however, was never carried into effect by the 
Czechoslovak governments. Hence this treaty guaranteed the individual, 
personal liberty to every Hungarian living in Czechoslovakia, the indivi­
dual and partly collective nationality rights to every citizen of Hungarian 
nat ionaiity.
What were these individual nationality rights? Equality before the 
law, equal civic and political oppotunities (no discrimination of citizens 
belonging to a national minority was permissible in giving employment, 
filling up offices, dignities, in pursuing trade, etc.), extensive right of 
using one’s language, teaching in the mother-tongue.7 The partially collec­
tive rights were laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of the treaty. „Les ressoi-
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tissants tchéco-slovaques, appartenant à (les minorités ethniques, de reli­
gion ou de langue, jouiront du même traitement et des mêmes garanties 
en droit et en fait que les autres ressortissants tehéco-slovaques. Ils auront 
notamment un droit égal a créer, diriger et contrôler a leurs frais des ins­
titutions charitables, regligieuses ou sociales, des écoles et entres étab­
lissements d ’éducation, avec le droit d ’y faire librement usage de leur 
propre langue et d ’y exercer librement leur religion“. (Art. 8) And in the 
towns and districts where nationalities of Czechoslovak citizenship lived 
in considerable proportions,........ se verront assurer une part équitab­
le . . .  “ ,,. . • qui pourraient êtreatribuées sur les fonds publics par le bud­
get de l’É tat, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d’éducation, 
de religion ou de charité“ (Art. fi)s. The restricted nature of the collective 
right was manifest mainly in the fact that these provisions dealt only with 
the citizens living in certain towns and districts, and not with the entire, 
rather compact nationality territory.
The Republic acknowledged the fact that the above-defined rights re­
lating to the nationalities were under the protection of the League of Na­
tions, and could not be altered without the majority consent of the Coun­
cil of the League. Czechoslovakia also agreed that each member of the 
Council should have the right to call the Council’s attention to the viola­
tion of these obligations: ,, . . .  et que le Conseil pourra procéder de telle 
façon et donner telles instructions qui paraîtront appropj riées et efficaces 
dans la circonstance. ,,In case of differences in opinion, Czechoslovakia 
agrees that the dispute “ sera considérée comme un différend ayant un 
caractère international . . . "  (Art. H), and that it must be brought before 
the Permanent Court9. Thus, the intervention of the Council limited 
Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty beyond doubt.
The aforesaid guarantees of the treaty of Saint Germain are contai­
ned not only in this agreement, but can be read in a more or less similar 
formulation also in the treaties made with the other victorious and de­
feated states10.
How did this minority-protective system operate in fact ? Here we 
must start from the circumstance that, the big powers wich created 
this system had failed to size up the consequences of the treaties, the resul­
ting role and obligations of the League of Nations. Namely the bourgeois 
states, including Czechoslovakia, were not willing to perform their cont­
ractual obligations in respect of the nationality rights wieh were guaran­
teed also in their respective constitutions and various provisions of law 
(this will be discussed in the Czechoslovak relation later on). And the 
bourgeois politicians of the minorities, the Hungarians of Slovakia among 
them, put irredentist slogans on their banners, relying on Germany and 
Hungary. It is an indisputable fact, to be sure, that there was universal 
discontent among the nationalities of countries. As a consequence, the 
League of Nations was over-showered with masses of complaints and warn­
ings, and this organization had to expand its apparatus dealing with 
minority questions as a result.
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The procedure was usually as follows: the submitted petition or 
memorandum was examined by the Secretary General to decide whether 
it can be accepted, and, if so, it was considered by the permanent minor­
ity commitee of tlie Council. The proeudere was completed by this dis­
cussion in the committee. Pursuant to the minority guarantee treaties, 
member states of Council had the right, in addition, to place on the agenda 
— in the form of a warning — the discussion of a given question, which 
then was referred to a three-member ad hoc committee, irespective of 
the meetings of the minority committee. There was also possibility of 
proceedings before tlie Permanent Court, but tl.i- was seldom resorted 
to. Pursuant to a resolution passed by the Council in .March, 1929, the 
governments of which it was ascertained that they had violated the trea­
ty. had to be contacted with a memorandum of frendlv wording, and had 
to be moved by the minority department to find a satisfactory solution 
or to supply further information.
Vet disputes arose between the interested states as soon as such a 
complaint was submitted. Czechoslovakia, for instance, took it amiss that 
the petitions and memoranda submitted by the minorities were put before 
the various committees without the opinion of the gevernment of the 
country in question. This objection was formulated as a suggestion, and 
this Czechoslovak motion was accepted in June 1921; the Secretary Ge­
neral therefore requested the comments of the governments concerned, 
and the complaint was discussed in the minority committee only after­
wards; the case was then referred to the Council".
It is not possible here, of course, to go through the grievances sub­
mitted by the nationalities of Czechoslovakia, we only wish to present a 
few examples. An early complaint was submitted by the Hungarian-Rut- 
henian Political Party on September 10, 1921. This party — which was 
not identical with the Sub-Carpathian Hungaiian Legal Party headed by 
Endre Korklth and oriented towards the Hungarian population — was 
under Hungarian bourgeois leadership but claimed representation of the 
national interests of the Ukrainians. I t  did so by feeding on the traditions 
of the dualistic era when the Ukrainians had still less of an independent 
national.movement than the Slovaks, when the Ukrainian intelligentsia 
surpassed the Slovakian in abandoning Ukrainian national aspirations 
and joined forces with the Hungarian government . This party compris­
ed the Magyarized Ukrainian elements and — following the Hungarian 
irredentist intention just as in the case of the Slovak autonomy — threw 
light in a detailed memorandum upon the undisputable fact that Czecho­
slovakia had violated the treaty of Saint Germain and had not granted the 
Ukrainians their autonomy . Paying regard to the opinion of the Czecho­
slovak government, the minority committee — in a report sent to the 
Council — expressed its confidence in the government of Czechoslovakia 
and stressed its conviction that autonomy would be granted according to 
the treaty in the territory of Czechoslovakia in the future.12.
The Hungarian and German parties of the opposition in Slovakia and 
the Carpathian Ukraine submitted a petition to the League of Nations
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in April 1923, and enumerated in it the complaints of the minorities — 
mainly Hungarian —living there. This memorandum contained the follow­
ing actual grievances to wich we shall revert later on: problems of 
Czechoslovak administration, minority statistics, of contacts with state 
agencies, schooling, cultural, economic questions. The Czechoslovak go­
vernment tried to refute the complaints by giving detailed reasons. The 
petition and the reply was made known to the League of Nations by the 
Secretary General.
Soon afterwards, a complaint relating to the Czechoslovak agrarian 
reform was sent to the League of Nat'ons by representatives of German 
and Hungarian opposition parties of the Czech and Slovak territories. 
Attacking this reform sharply, they emphasized that persons of the minor­
ity were excluded from the implementation of the reform, that there 
was a discrimination between Czech and minority territories, that forced 
sales and colonization were resorted to in the latter, and that these minor­
ities were excluded from getting their share of land. And even if the na­
tional motivation of this land reform, which hit the German and Hunga­
rian population hard, cannot be disputed, this petition was mainly in­
tended to protect the interests of the landowner class, last but not least 
by requesting suspension of the land reform since it was contiary to the 
treaty of minority protection. The Secretary General of the League of 
Nations forwarded the petition to the Czechoslovak government in 
October 1924, and in its reply the government stressed the following: 
“ . . . an investigation into concrete data shows that the cases in question 
were presented distorted and without any accuracy, and that they do 
not prove at all that minority rights should have been violated. Thus the 
allegations of the petition are lacking all conclusive proof.” The Secretary 
Gehneral referred both the petition and the reply to the members of the 
Council.
In April 1925, members of the Hungarian opposition parties in the 
Czechoslovak house of representatives brought it up that, contrary to 
the treaty, the government does not grant Czechoslovak citizenship to 
Hungarians who are entitled to it. The matter was dealt with in similar 
ways as the former13.
The counterrevolutionary Hungarian government came forward at 
the League of Nations with questions of greater import and more general 
aspects, as well as with procedural suggestions. At the V lth session of the 
League the Hungarian delegation suggested, among others, to recognize 
national minorities as legal persons, i.e. to ensure them full collective 
rights. The Hungarian government requested further that consideration 
of complaints and petitions should not take after the preliminary hearing 
of the government of the country concerned, and requested therefore to 
revoke the decision passed on the basis of the Czechoslovak suggestion of 
June 1921. Finally, the Hungarian government suggested to hear the 
representatives of the minorities. These demands were rejected most re­
solutely by the Czechoslovak delegation.
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Late in the 1920’s and early in the 30’s, the procedural disputes about 
tlie consideration of petitions and memoranda cont inued bet ween the stat ­
es opposing one another, and were just as unfortunate polemics as the 
investigation and discussion of the grievances and complaints14.
All these examples illustrate clearly — in respect of Czechoslovakia 
— the failure of the minority-protection policy. The incessant attacks of 
the bourgeois parties of the Hungarian oppposition (although they were 
often based on actual grievances) and the defensive and rigidly negative 
attitude of the government only resulted in a sharpening of differences, 
while the Leguae of Nations was impotent it could not, and actually did 
not want to, bring about decisions of real value.
The crisisofthe minority-protecting policy, closely interrelated with 
the peace system of Versailles, became even more manifest at the time of 
the fascist sweep. The efforts aimed at maintaining a system that did not 
work proved to be altogether futile at that time. The fascist states were 
gathering strength, and although they pursued the policy of a cruel op­
pression of minorities in their countries, they pleased themselves in the 
role of the protectors minorities in the public opinion. And even if we do 
not forget for a moment the often gravely wrong nationality policy ofthe 
Czech bourgeoisie, we now can agree basically with Beneš who wrote in 
the days before the Republic was crushed: the fascist countries present 
themselves as the protectors of minorities and abuse cynically the de­
mocratic liberties which were granted, for example, also by Czechoslova­
kia to its nationalities, and for serving the purposes of their unjust revi­
sionist policy, they exaggerate in international public opinion the insig­
nificant domestic problems of the country15.
As time passed, the grave shortcomings of the minority-protesting 
system be came increasingly evident; but large-scale scientific activities 
began nevertheless in this respect, mainly in the field of international 
and comparative law. Scientific institutions concerned with the national­
ity question came into being, periodicals were published, and growing 
research — depending on the country pursuing it — supplied the concep­
tions of opposed states with argument material.
Since the of Versailles elevated the minority question to the inter­
national level, and this problem was handled as a political affair by the 
treaties, some non-official international organizations assumed special 
importance. Their importance became manifest in the shaping of an 
international legal theory, in the development of projects, and in the 
influencing of the minority-protecting system. Such non-official organ­
izations were the following: the Congress of National Groups Organized 
in European States (Kongress der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in 
den Staaten Europas),the Federation ofthe Friedly Societies ofthe League 
of Nations (L’Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations), the 
Interparliamentary Union, the International Law Association, the latter 
having special committees and groups which studied nat iona lit v prob­
lems.1«
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Apart from the international guarantees, the status of national min­
orities, including the Hungarians in Slovakia, was determined much 
more by the internal conditions of the given state, by the statues and 
decrees influencing national development of the minorities. The status of 
the Hungarians in Slovakia was regulated by numerous prescriptions 
ranging from those of general bearing to the special ones, to measures re­
lating to districts, villages or individuals. The basic documents were the 
constitution of the Republic, and the language act.
Before examining these in detail, we must stress the well-known 
fact the constitution of Czechoslovakia was a bourgeois-democratic 
constitution which granted more liberties to the Hungarian population 
than were granted to the great majority of the Hungarian people by the 
counterrevolutionary Horthv regime, i f  we disregard the short period 
of the Karolyi government and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, it appears 
that, in respect of bourgeois liberties, the Czechoslovak bourgeois demo­
cracy gave the Hungarians more than any other system undei whiehthey 
lived, even if we take into account that the Hungarians there had lost 
their nationally advantageous position and were affected most adversely 
by many a measure in this respect.17 The representatives of the various 
progressive tendencies in counterrevolutionary Hungary were — contrary 
to the official irredentism and to public opinion — fully aware of this 
important fact. The confessions of Zsigmond Moricz are characteristic in 
this respect and may be regarded as symbolic. During his travels in 
Czechoslovakia, he was greatly impressed by the young Hungarians among 
whom he emphasized the effect of the atmosphere of the bourgeois demo­
cracy that differed from Hungary. He called them “Hungarians with a 
new face” , pointed out their “more social and more cultured” Hungarian 
traits. This youth acted on him as revelation, on “Frater Julianus” who 
discovered them18.
The bourgeois-democratic system of Czechoslovakia-which impressed 
its marks also on national opportunities — differed from the system 
of Roumania and Yugoslavia in a favourable sense. This bourgeois de­
mocracy created a better situtation for the Hungarians in Slovakia than 
the Hungarians had in the two other neighbouring states. Paragraph 1 of 
the Czechoslovak constitution adopted on February 29, 1920, enacted 
tha t the sole source of state power in th Republic is the people, and that 
legislative power shall be exercised by the national assembly (parliament) 
consisting of the house of representatives and the senate. Elections shall 
take place on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. Yet 
in respect of voting and eligibility (the right of voting for representatives 
was due from the age of 21, for senators from the age of 26, eligibility was 
from the age of 30 and 45 respectively) there was a restriction which was 
not negligible as concerned the Hungarian minority: it was citizenship. 
Similarly to the treaty of Saint Germain, the constitution guaranteed per­
sonal freedom and civic democratic liberties to all inhabitants resp. ci­
tizens of the country, irrespective of national, ethnic and religious diffe­
rences,19.
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As concerns the minority rights, it was a point of attack that, con­
trasted to the treaty of Saint Germain, the constitution contained sentences 
of restrictive effect, and omitted important provisions of the treaty. For 
example minority rights were only guaranteed “within the limits of the 
general laws” and it was added that “all this does not affect the rights of 
the state organs which are due to them by virtue of both valid and the 
laws to be passed for maintaining public order, the security of the state, 
and efficient supervision.” The first sentence of Article 8 of the treaty of 
Saint Germain ,,Les ressortissants tchéco-slovaques. . . ” ), which stresses 
the equality of rights of the nationalities clearly, was not included in the 
constitution, it was only stated that “on the basis of rights and reality . . . 
they are equal to the other Czechoslovak citizens.”
The following restrictive passage is inserted in several paragraphs of 
the constitution: “within the limits of general laws and regulations.” The 
constitution held out the prospect of passing a language act as its own or­
ganic conStitutient part, as well as the framing of further statutes for 
guaranteeing universal liberties and the protection of nationalities. It 
was promised, too, that Article 9 of the treaty of Saint Germain would be 
implemented by a special decree of enforcement. Said Article provided 
th a t the minorities must have an equitable share in the budgetary alloca­
tions for educational, religious and charitable purposes. Thus the con­
stitution contained the rightful claims, but these were never enforced be­
cause the special regulations failed to come about. This was the case also 
with the other statutes mentioned; with the except ion of the language act, 
these were never passed.
These striking shortcomings and contradictions were constantly 
kept on the agenda by the oppositionist Hungarian parties and by the 
delegations of counterrevolutionary Hungary at various bodies, including 
the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak government rejected such cri­
ticism — as soon as the constitution was enacted — saying that it pro­
tects the sovereignty of the state in this way20.
We cannot leave unmentioned a highly remarkable passage of the 
constitution which reflects clearly the appearance of the bourgeois-demo­
cratic principle in the nationality question: ,,. . .no forcible method of de­
nationalization is permissible. Elusion of this principle may lie qualified 
as punishable under the law“ (may, and not must!). The restrictive for­
mulation of this important principle is typical of a bourgeois democracy, 
just as the declarat ion of the principle proper, namely the declaration — 
and this is again characteristic of a bourgeois democracy — did not yet 
mean the enforcement of this principle in reality21.
Glorification or depreciation of the constitution would be unfair. 
Basically, it provided for a democratization of life which had no counter­
part in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We must not forget at the same 
time now the constitution came into being, how it was launched: it was 
nothing else but the stabilization of the bourgeois system, a reflection of 
the fact that the Czech bourgeoisie succeded in preventing the bourgeois 
revolution from transforming into the socialist revolution22.
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The language act was part of the constitution. Its starting-point was 
the enactment of Czechoslovak as the official language, and this was based 
on an actually non-existent Czechoslovakism which refused to recognize 
the Slovaks as a nation.23 Needless to say, this fact was nothing less than 
declarative, because Slovakian was, and continued to be, the vernacular 
in Slovakia for the most part.
It is interesting to note that the right- wing Christian Socialist oppo­
sition, which had an eye to Hlinka’s Popular Party not without an ulterior 
motive, took sides with the Slovaks in connection with the establishment 
of the Czechoslovak official language. The cunning remarks in parliament 
of the landowner Lajos Kôrmendv-Ékes hardly concealed the well- 
known anti-Czech autonomist conception: ‘'We simply do not know” he 
said on January 28. 1921, — “which language we should learn, the Czech 
or the Slovak, since the Czechoslovak language declared as the official 
language of the state does not exist. I should gladly learn Slovakian which 
1 have taken to my heart, but I have nothing in common with the Czech 
language, and so I feel no sympathy with it. But when we see that in the 
Slovak territory the language of administration is the Czech everywhere 
. . . then we are at a loss what to do in this question”24.
In the parliamentary preamble to the language bill — turning now to 
the minority rights — reference is made to the treaty of Saint Germain, to 
the provision that the national existence, the opportunities of cultural 
improvement, must be guaranteed to the minorities, that “the ways for 
asserting their language rights must be looked for and found,”
Paragraph 2 of the Act provided in this respect as follows: “The 
courts, offices and other authorities of the Republic whose area of opera­
tion comprises court districts in which — according to the latest census — 
at least 20% of the citizens living there speak the same language differing 
from the Czechoslovak, shall in every matter they have to deal with in 
such district accept petitions in the language of the minority, and shall 
attend to such petitions not only in the Czechoslovak, but also in the other 
language, i.e. the language of the petition.” This meant practically that 
Czechoslovak, as the official language of the state, was valid in all districts, 
but in districts where the ratio of citizens belonging to some nationality 
was 20% (and in this instance we must again stress the concept of citizen, 
and not inhabitant) bilingualism of the authorities could be requested. 
This paragraph also defined the cases in which official action had to be 
only in the minority language, and laid down the principle that public 
notices of courts, offices and authorities could be published also in the 
language of the minorities.
Paragraph 3 guaranteed all this also for the various organs of self- 
government. We should like to mention in this connection that the lang­
uage to be used in the debates of the National Assembly was dealt with by 
several acts of parliament (325/1920. 205/1922. 88/1933). Paiagraph 49 
of the first act passed on April 15,1920,reads as follows: “The represent­
atives shall deliver their speech in the Czechoslovak language. The Ger­
man, Russian (Ukrainien), Hungarian or Polish nationality représentât iv-
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es if they do not wish to use the Czechoslovak language, may speak the 
language of their nationality.”r5
Numerous government decrees were issued on the enforcement of 
the language act. The decree published on January 31, 1924, determined 
the languages to be used in assemblies of county representatives and co- 
mittees. The decree coming into force on February 3, 192(3, implemented 
the language act in the sphere of the various ministries. And the govern­
ment decree published on December 29, 1928, determined the languages 
to be used in self-governing districts. All these decrees were based on the 
20% ratio. As a consequence of changes in the census data — these had 
several reasons, and the machinations of the bourgeois democracy were 
not absent from them — the 22 rural districts of Slovakia where 20% or 
more Hungarians were living were somewhat reduced in number after 
1930.
This reduction resulted in the limitation of nationality rights in 
some districts. Among the decrees on the enforcement of the language 
act, decree no. 1928/229 deserves special mention: it provided that in the 
field of administration — if more than 50% of the citizens in the district 
belong to nationalities — the various documents written in the official 
language of the state must be translated into the minority language in 
question. And if this ratio was over 75% — in bourgeois circumstances 
this was a measure of special significance, although there was a way out 
as well — the documents did not have to be published in the official lang­
uage in addition, unless there was request to this effect (and there always 
was, of course)'-0.
Paragraph 5 of the basic language act dealt with the language of 
teaching in schools; in the schools set up for the national minorities, teach­
ing was in their language, and the administrative language of their cul­
tural institutions was the same. This general principle was regulated by 
laws and decrees. The act published on April 3. 1919, was governing for 
primary, higher elementary, and private schools; on a three-year average 
it prescribed at least 40 schoolable children for organizing primary schools, 
and 400 for higher elementary schools. Teaching was in the mother- 
tongue of the pupils. The act did not tie the hands of the minister of 
education in respect of higher elementary schools: in case of “weighty 
reasons” he was free to decide differently. Quite naturally, this could 
have been of advantage to the nationalities as well: but needless to say, 
it was rather disadvantageous. Yet this act did not come into force in 
Slovakia, the necessary enforcement decree was never published, and 
this was detrimental not only to the Hungarian, but to the whole school 
system in Slovakia.
The secondary schools and the teachers’ training schools were regu­
lated by an act published on June 8, 1923. It provided that the official 
language of the state must be taught as a compulsory subject in these 
schools.
In addition to regulations relating to schools, there were decrees and 
laws that regulated the establishment and operation of public libraries,
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school administration, activities of school boards, etc, All these affected 
also the Hungarians to a greater or lesser extent.27
What has been presented in the foregoing offered a lot of opportunit­
ies for national development. But the rights guaranteed on the paper 
often failed to become practice, and — as we have seen — laws and de­
crees, or even the constitution itself, frequently offered means and ways 
for eluding these rights.27'“ Were it not for Czechoslovakia being a bour­
geois democracy at that time, the equality of rights could have become 
reality for the minorities. Still, it cannot be denied that it was easier to 
fight for codified rights, and this was more promising as well, than a 
struggle which could make no reference to established statutes. The status 
of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia took a more favourable turn also 
in this respect than that of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia and Roumania.
If we wish to make a general survey of the practice in Czechoslovakia, 
we must first turn our attention to the early years of that state, to the 
period preceding the constitution, when — as a result of various Czechoslo­
vak decisions — the formerly ruling Hungarian nation was reduced to a 
status of minority, and placed in a disadvantageous position. What were 
these decisions ? The formation of the new state was organically inter­
twined with the mass dismissal of Hungarian civil servants, with their 
exclusion from the right to retirement pay. Yet in this connection we 
cannot leave unmentioned several important facts. The overwhelming 
majority of the Hungarian civil servants refused to take the oath of alle­
giance to the new state, many of them were gentries of antidemocratic 
feelings; owing to their chauvinism, their human attitude, to the spirit 
prevailing among the officials of old Hungary — wihch it was difficult to 
get rid of — they were not fit for satisfying the demands of a modern 
bourgeoisie. We must further emphasize — and this was a bed worry for 
Czechoslovak administration — that not more than 304 civil servants of 
Slovakian mother tongue were active at the time of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. Despite of the mass dismissal of Hungarian officials, there 
were 21 of Hungarian nationality among the high-ranking county officers 
in the four Hungarian-inhabited counties before 1923. No county lieute­
nants and councillors, to be sure, but there were county clerks and chief 
constables among them.28
This process was associated with the overall suspension of the self- 
governing bodies that had developed at the time of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The Czechoslovak authorities dissolved the county, district 
and village boards of representatives, and put their place, for a while, go­
vernment commissioners and appointed councils. The churches shared a 
similar lot: the properties of the Catholic Church were managed by a state 
organ, the autonomy of the Protestant Churches was abolished and they 
were placed under the administration of government commissioners. The 
same happened to the chambers of commerce and industry, to the chamb­
er of lawyers, to sick-relief organizations. Many economic societies were 
prohibited temporarily.
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A somewhat favourable tendency began in respect of the bodies of 
local representatives after the elect ions of 1920; and there was a change in 
the case of the church some years after: the Protestants — although they 
had grievances — regained their autonomy, the Catholic Church recover­
ed right of disposal over their own estates. And even if there were 
attemps at diriving back the Hungarian influence in the Christian church­
es — this was easiest among the Lutherans since about 30% of the 
Slovaks followed this faith — their activities of nationality nature were 
basically not hindered. Church societies, organizations were operating in 
large numbers, they had schools where teaching was in Hungarian 
(elementary schools, a few grammar schools, teachers’training schools, 
seminaries), and had a press of considerable influence. But the various 
chambers and sick-relief organisations were left without autonomy all 
through; and although the influence of the Hungarians in these institu- 
tionsgrew again after some years, the government maintained its positions 
— which it had gained after the formation of the new state — also in the 
territories of decisive Hungarian majority since it did not restore their 
autonomy. (In the Czech territories of the country, these organisations 
had their autonomy all the time).
It was connected with the formation of Czechoslovakia — and was a 
transitory state — that the constituent national assembly which operat­
ed before the parliamentary elections of April 1920 had no nationality, 
i.e. Hungarian members. The Germans insisted on representation, but 
were refused. And this eonstitutuent assembly framed fundamental 
statutes of great importance, the constitution first of all.
As concerns the following years of the Republic, a measure taken in 
1922 was a grave wrong to the Hungarians: several corporate towns were 
reduced to the administrative status of large villages. This affected thirty- 
five boroughs and towns in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine. Only 
Pozsony (Bratislava) and Kassa (Košiće) in Slovakia, and Ungvâr 
(Uzhorod) and .Munîmes (Munkačevo) in the Carpathian Ukraine continued 
as corporate towns in this way.This step,although it affected quitea numb­
er of towns with a Slovak majority, reduced the Hungarian influence 
first of all owing to the fact that the towns had a considerable number of 
Hungarian inhabitants. Although it must be admitted that many of 
these towns were surrounded by territories with a compact Slovak popu­
lation29.
It would us lead too far if we imvestigated how these Hungarian 
enclaves had taken shape, how far this was due to natural historical 
development, or to the Magyar ization in the 19th and 20th centuries which 
did not refrain even from forcible methods. We knew from the Czechoslo­
vak memoranda submitted to the peace conference — and this was the 
standpoint of the Slovak and Czech national movement already in the era 
of the Dual Monarchy — that the new state assessed this historical deve­
lopment solely as forcible interference which had to he reversed since 
this was an ethical demand and was suggested also by the interests of the 
nation.30 And if we pass a harsh judgment on such measures of Magyar-
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ization, we must condemn Czechoslovakia likewise for the steps taken 
resolutely and consistently for the aforesaid reasons, and not without 
result as a matter of fact. Nor can it be denied that in these territories of 
a mixed population — which, however, were preponderantly Slovak 
territories — there were many people among the petty bourgeoisie and 
intelligentsia who had been intimidated in the time of the Monarchy, or 
who abandoned their Slovak nationality for the sake of their career, but 
still spoke their mother-tongue and were tied with many bonds to their 
Slovak nation. It is commonly known, too, tha t in the Dualistic Era the 
situation of the Slovak national movement — which could not rely on 
glorious historic antecendents and had to fight hard for its mere 
existence — was extremely difficult, and therefore the reversal of this pro­
cess was considered as doing historic justice to them. The bourgeois leaders 
of the new state believed — if not admittedly— that if they failed to inter­
fere with the course of development tlie innervations of many decades 
might consolidate, even increase, the Hungarian enclaves in the compact 
Slovak territories. Despite all this, and adding that tlie first unjust and 
forcible measures had been taken by the Hungarian ruling class, there 
is no justification for carrying out the drastic measures of the Dualistic 
Era the other way around. This is contradicted by the bourgeois-demo­
cratic ideals Czechoslovakia professed, and by the human demand that 
vengeance cannot bring the long desired peace and understanding for 
the much- suffered peoples of East Europe. Let us mention already 
here that, following the Vienna Award, also Hungary’s ruling circles 
rat-abated the wrongs done to the Hungarians, and this process of ven­
geance did not stop for there years following the liberation in Czecho­
slovakia either31.
Returning to the territories of mixed population, and the period 
following 1918: the forcible steps in respect of a town, Eperjes ( Pre.šov), 
are presented convincingly in the memories of JânosGömöry, a democratic- 
minded grammar school teacher. The methods employed here were not 
unique, they characterized the policy pursued in similar towns of Slovakia. 
Otherwise the development of territories with a mixed population, of 
nationality islands, was typical of entire East Europe, and attempts at 
liquidating them were made by the bourgeois governments of the ruling 
nations everywhere, now by drastic, now by more refined methods. Need­
less to say. this is no excuse for the policy of the Czechoslovak government : 
which tried to promote assimilation through the aforesaid administrative 
measures (degradation of towns ), through the restriction and prohibition 
of the use of Hungarian, mainly through the Slovakization of schools, 
immediate abolition of Hungarian as the language of teaching, dissolution 
of Hungarian cultural organizations. In the territories of a mixed popula­
tion, all this was supported by the language act: it laid down the 20% 
ratio for rural districts (not for villages and towns), i.e. the use of the 
minority language in question v as granted only if the nationality popu­
lation reached tha t ratio; however, the Hungarian inhabitants of the 
towns concerned, being within the districts of the Slovak ethnic groups,
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did not reach this ratio. Hence one restriction in the language act was the 
indisputable fact that it contained no provisions in respect of the consi­
derable sporadic groups.
One argument of the Slovaks against the Hungarian language of 
teaching was that it cannot be tolerated because all lessons of Hungarian 
literature and history cause great damage to the Czechoslovak conception 
o f  the state. It was a frequent argument, too, that “if we, the Slovaks, 
were able to preserve our language for thousand years, also the Hungarian 
should do their best to preserve theirs despite the deprival o f their 
schools and culture.,,32
We have discussed the Hungarian sporadic ethnic groups in some 
detail because, ever since the usual arguments at the peace conference, 
the favourite topic the Czechoslovak authorites and public opinion was 
the stressing of the reciprocity of the Slovaks in Hungary and the Hunga­
rians in Slovakia,33 although the localization of the Slovaks in Hungary, 
their sporadic groups, showed much semblance with these Hungarian 
enclaves. This is by no means to say that we intend to excuse counter­
revolutionary Hungary, quite the contrary. If  the Horthy regime has not 
resorted to drastic steps comparable with the foregoing, this may be ex­
plained by the fact that there was simply no need for it. The nationalities 
in Hungary, including the Slovaks, -  and this was a fundamental diffe­
rence -  did not know the literary language of their nation, and their 
national self-consciousness — И there was any — was on a very low level. 
The cultural policy of Hungarian governments was aimed at pushing 
the process of Magyarization, resulting from the sporadic nature of the 
nationalities (the Slovaks) and from the lack of national self-conscious­
ness. and in doing so they did not refrain from forcible means. So there 
was hardly anything these two states could reproach each other; only 
the position of counterrevolutionary Hungary proved to be easier,even 
if we disregard theterritoriesofcompact Hungarian population in Slovakia, 
and think only of the sporadic Hungarian ethnic groups there: Hungarian 
governments had to deal with nationalities belonging to the peasant 
stratum for the most part, having no bourgeois strata, having never had a 
national movement, and being on the way to Magyarization.
One feature of the nationality policy of the Czechoslovak govern­
ments was the territorial arrangement of the constituencies, which hit 
all Hungarian territories badly. Although franchise was universal, direct, 
and secret, the constituencies were marked out in such a way that — in 
addition to the requirement of Czechoslovak citizenship — while in 1920 
an average of 19 753 votes was required for a seat in parliament in the 
territories of Slovak population, this figure was 27 697 for voting into 
parliament a Hungarian representative, i.e. it was more by nearly 8 
thousand, or 40%. I he situation in the Czech territories was still more 
favourable for this policy. And since in South Slovakia the social-democra­
tic left wing (and the communist later on )had a greater influence, this 
electoral geometry pushed back not only the right-wing Hungarian parties 
but also the revolutionary labour movement. The situation was similar
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also in respect of the seats of senators. The number of votes for seating a 
senator was 73 949 in Prague, was 105 504 at Érsekûjvâr (Nové Zâmky), 
and 143 007 in the Carpathian Ukraine.
The circumstance that 100 signatures were required in the Czech terri­
tories for nomination, and 1000 in Slovakia — to be attested by the county 
authorities — was another discrimination.
As concerned the bodies of representatives for administrative units, 
the electoral returns were corrected by the government in its own interest 
bv appointing representatives to these bodies from among the parties of 
the government coalition. The same applied to the bodies of provincial 
representatives established in 1928. Such provincial autonomies were 
formed in the Czech territory, in Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia and the Car­
pathian Ukraine. After the two elections (December 1928, and May 1935), 
there were only 36 elected, but 18 appointed among the 54.
The rural districts to replace the former six counties (1923— 1928) 
were established at the same time; bodies of représentatives, made up of 
18 to 16 members was appointed by the government similary to the provin­
cial bodies.
Hence the Hungarian opposition parties did have elected representa­
tion in these bodies; but there was evidently none among the appointed 
members.
It goes without saying that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
had no appointed representatives in parliament, and that numerous 
communist of Hungarian nationality were to be found in the self-governing 
bodies of the Hungarian population.
We have referred repeatedly to the 20% ratio of nationalities in the 
language act. Machinations similar to those in the demarcation of the 
constituencies are seen also here. Namely the division of the rural districts 
(and, earlier, of the counties) was based on a scheme that reduced, as far 
as possible, the number of districts where the nationality population could 
reach the ratio required for using the minority language. In the case of 
the Hungarians, the long, narrow frontier territory extending from west 
to east — the principal Hungarian-inhabited area — was split up mainly 
into long, narrow districts extending from south to north, and the number 
of Hungarians in these administrative units was reduced thereby as a 
matter of course. The districts namely extending from south to north 
connected territories of Slovak population with Hungarian regions. The 
Hungarians here were put in a disadvantageous situation as early as the 
20’s among others in the districts of Pozsony, Kassa, Rimaszombat, 
(Rimavska Sobota), Nitra (Nyitra) and Gâlszécs (Sečovce); there being 
no 20% nationality ratio, the Minister of Justice prohibited the use of 
Hungarian there. The Supreme Administrative Court declared this 
decree to be contrary to law only in the case of the Rimaszombat 
district, but this brought no change because the returns of the later cen­
sus of 1930 showed a lower ratio than before.
It has been mentioned repeatedly how great a role citizenship played 
in the guarantee of minority rights. The Hungarians were therefore hit
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hard by a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in 1923 which 
interpreted t lie right of registered domicile in a restricted sense concerning 
Slovakia and the Carapathian l kraine: it provided as tlie precondition 
for acquiring this that right the person interested, or his father, must he 
admitted to the civil parish in question by a decision put on record not 
later than in 1906, and excluded thereby the possibility of the tacit 
acquisition of this right which, however, was guaranteed in the treaty of 
Saint Germain. The consequence was that the certificates of domicile of 
thousands of Hungarians, who already were in possession of recognized 
citizenship, were annulled. And although between 1926 and 1930 citizen­
ship was granted to thousands every year, the number of stateless or alien 
Hungarians in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine had grown bv 1930 
bv about 10 ooo (from 10 000 to 20 000) compared to the census in 1921. 
These problems surrounding citizenship gave rise to uncertainty, and 
affected particularly pensionable persons. It even happened that the 
government, fairly often, refused to grant citizenship to persons who had 
met their obligation to serve in the Czechoslovak army34.
Considering the practice of administrative and political life, it can 
be laid down as a fact that the methods employed in this respect in the 
other two countries were still more drastic. Jn Yugoslavia, for example, 
the electoral law of 1920 disfranchised masses of Hungarians. Contrary 
to Czechoslovakia — even Roumania —the Hungarian Party which had 
just managed to exist up to 1929 was not able to run for elections inde­
pendently in N ugoslavia. 1 he three Hungarian representatives seated in 
parliament in 1927 were running on the ticket of the Serbian Radical 
Party.35 In bourgeois Roumania, the citizenship act of 1924 was a viola­
tion of political and human rights: it had much graver consequences for 
the Hungarians in Iransylvania than the comparable Czechoslovak 
measures for the Hungarians in Slovakia. And although the motive was 
si milar in Roumania, this act denied hundreds o ft housands of H ungarians 
the citizenship. And from the early thirties, in the years of crisis and 
a swing to the right, Hungarian workers and employees were dismissed en 
masse, and when racism began to make headway .Hungarians were draft­
ed for military and forced-labour service, there was forced subscription 
to the war-loan, there was violence and incessant harrassing.To use nat ional- 
ity languages, including Hungarian, was prohibited in the administra­
tion, or was practically impossible. A language act, like that of Czechoslo­
vakia, often critized with good reason, was out of the question in Rouman- 
nia.30
As concerns cultural life, we must first consider the schools. The 
Czechoslovak governments pursued a nationality educational policy 
similar to that of the dualism, but in the opposite sense as a matter of 
course. The denominational and village primary schools in the Hungarian 
regions, inherited from the past regime and rather neglected, were left 
more or less intact, but well-equipped state schools with Slovak as the 
language of teaching were established to make these schools of the state 
attractive to Hungarian parents. Since the Hungarian schools were
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hardly developed, tliey — including the secondary Schools — were over­
crowded, and the government did not care much about building schools 
where teaching was in Hungarian. A special social organization, the 
Slovenska liga, was formed which eared not only for the Slovaks in Hun­
gary. but also made efforts for providing more and more Slovak schools 
in the Hungarian territories of Slovakia. The operations of t lie Slovenska 
liga followed the example of the Magyarizing social organization of the 
Dualistie Era, of the Cultural Society of Upper Hungary (FEMKE), 
which was patterned after the Prussian Ostmarkvereine for Germanizing 
the Poles.
The insufficient support by the Czechoslovak state was only one fac­
tor in the inadequacy of the Hungarian school network (the extremely 
small number of the Hungarian kindergartens was especially conspicuous); 
the natural attraction to the ruling nation also a role. A relatively large 
number of Hungarian parents sent their children to Slovak schools for 
acquiring the official language of the state, considering their future 
career. The right- wing H ungarian parties estimated the number of Hunga­
rian children attending Slovak schools at 14 000. It should be noted in 
this connection that in fifteen communities with a 75% Hungarian 
majority there were only Slovak primary schools.
Between 1921 and 1926, the number of Hungarian higher elementary 
schools decreased by 5,3% while similar schools grew bv 12,4% in the 
entire country. The number of pupils in higher elementary and secondary 
schools of Czech and Slovak language was more than fifty times higher 
than the number of pupils in the same types of school wheie teaching was 
in Hungarian, although it appears from the returns of the Czechoslovak 
census in 1921 that the Czechoslovak population was only nine times 
larger than the Hungarian minority.
These data — which had extremely disadvantageous consequences — 
also comprised the deplorable fact that, after 1918, three important 
grammar-schools were closed down in Hungarian-populated territories, 
in the towns of Leva (Levice), Rozsnvö (Rožnava) and Ungvâr. The 
educational policy of the bourgeois-democratic state was clearly charac­
terized by fact that no teachers of Hungarian nationality were active in 
educational administration — ranging from ministry to the district school 
inspectorates — that not one Hungarian State operated grammar-school 
was headed by a Hungarian headmaster, that part of the teachers active 
in Hungarian elementary, secondary, schools and teachers’ training schools 
were not Hungarians, and that Hungarian teachers — again as a con­
sequence of a purposeful policy — were assigned to Slovak and Carpatho- 
Ukrainian schools. Another great schorteoming of Hungarian teaching in 
Slovakia was the fact that, except for theology, there was no establish­
ment of higher education with Hungarian as the language of teaching. 
Summing up: the number of Hungarian schools was lower by 31% than 
it ought to have been on the basis of the official census returns.57
Contrary to the schools, the Hungarians in Slovakia had a very 
extensive network of cultural associations. True, the Czechoslovak govern-
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ments upheld several ministerial decrees dating from the Dualistic Era, 
from the 70’s of the last century, which, consolidated the privileged 
status of the ruling nation. But between t he two World Wars these decrees 
had their repercussion on the Hungarians and impaired the unfolding of 
cultural life to some extent; one decree of the Hungarian minister of the 
interior, for example, gave ample opportunity for rejecting new bv laws 
in this field. Yet, basically, the bourgeois-democratic system did not hin­
der after all the foundation and extensive activity of cultural societies, 
let alone political organizations which were permissible like-wise :i!i.
If a comparison is made between the educational systems, the Czecho­
slovak democracy appears in a somewhat favourable light. It must be 
kept in mind that schools are of fundamental importance in the life of 
minorities, that teaching in the mother-tongue is the most decisive factor 
in the survival of any nationality. So it was not by chance that oppressive 
measures were aimed at these institutions which constituted a- firm basis 
for the minorities. The pan-Serbian chauvinism did all in its power to wear 
away the schools of Hungarian language. The governments assigned a 
considerable proportion of the Hungarian teachers to Serbo-Croatian 
schools, and there was practically no training of Hungarian teachers at 
the same time. Bilingual teaching was introduced, and children with a 
non-Hungarian name but of Hungarian mother-tongue were not permitted 
to attend Hungarian schools. In Roumania, the act of 1924 was inteded 
to shut the doors of primary schools to Hungarian children through a 
similar method of name-analysis as in Yugoslavia. Namely it was left to 
the headmasters of the Roumanian state schools to determine the child’s 
nationality on the basis ol its name, and to approve or refuse admission to 
the Hungarian primary schools. And the secondary final examination act 
of 1925 made possible to fail Hungarian students en masse: they had to 
sit for examination in towns alien to them, before boards who spoke no 
Hungarian, without interpreters in many cases; it was tried to bar Hunga­
rians from further studies in this way. It was prescribed by the Roumanian 
educational authorities that history, geography and principles of constitu­
tional law must be taught in Roumanian even in Hungarian schools. The 
bourgeois Roumanian governments created in the nationality territories 
the so-called cultural zones where teachers excelling in their “national” 
endeavours of Roumanization were given special reward. The term “cul­
tural zone ’ comprised the notion that Roumanian represents the higher 
culture, and tha t through denationalization, through spreading the 
western culture, the Roumanians fulfil a noble mission in this way.
“Re-Roumanization” became a favourite thesis of this oppressive 
national ideology: it was emphasized that the Székely (i.e. the Hungarians 
living in North-East Transylvania) were originally Roumanians and that, 
therefore, they must be led back to their original national communitv. 
The chauvinistic Roumanian governments availed themselves of the assis­
tance of the Greek Orthodox Church for this purpose, and a cultural 
organization — called Astra — was intended to serve the Roumanization 
of the Székely through considerable subsidies. This conception was not
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unknown in Slovakia either, but more moderate means were employed for 
carrying it through, mainly in territories of a mixed population.
All this was a cultural policy that pointed beyond the walls of the 
school, and naturally, made felt itself in all fields. The theatre act of 1926 
permitted only performances in Roumanian in state theatres. The showing 
of Hungarian sound-pictures was prohibited on the plea that Hungarian 
does not belong to the group of “universal culture languages”. Apart from 
the school, there were numerous difficulties in other cultural fields in the 
way of Hungarian development in the voivodeship in Yugoslavia as well.39 
Hence,compared with Yugoslavia andRoumania,there were no education­
al measures in Czechoslovakia that would have been overtly discriminat­
ing to the Hungarians; and even if, despite ali this, Hungarian cultural 
life was not negligible in two other countries, it never reached the dimen­
sions seen in the Czechoslovak Republic, not to speak of political organi­
zations.
Returning now to Czechoslovakia, we must draw our conclusions. 
The right-wing Hungarian parties ascribed the doubtless and not insig­
nificant decrease of the Hungarian speaking territories to the aforesaid 
nationality policy of the government first of all. Of what extent was this 
decrease actually ?
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num ber o f villages w ith H ungarian  inhab itan ts
Y ear
to ta l fully H ungarian H ungarianm ajo rity
H ungarian
m inority
1918 818 071 76 71
census of 
1921 805 651 94 00
census o f 
1930 700 556 149 55
As concerns details, the most significant changes — proceeding from 
west to east — were the following: 1. The minority nature of Pozsony 
ceased. 2. The double peninsula extending from Vereboly was detached 
from the Hungarian linguistic area and became thereby a single, major 
enclave. 3. With tlie disappearance of Bâtorfalu north of Szlovakgyarmat, 
the western major Hungarian block was split into two, and the closed 
Hungarian linguistic area was thereby divided into three separate parts.
4. Cessation of the minority nature of Kassa, and the complete absorp­
tion of the surrounding minor enclaves. In the case of the sporadic Hun­
garian groups, decrease may be estimated at 8 to 50%, in the case of the 
closed block at 5 to 8%. Loss calculated in absolute figures during 9 
years, comparing the two censues, was 62 839 people40.
This decrease of the Hungaiian population by about 10% cannot be 
ascribed with simplifying arguments mainly to a policy of assimilation. 
This is a complex question whose chief components are the following: 
1 ) The consolidation of the new state — apart from its nationality policy -  
attracted the petty bourgeois and intellectual elements of Slovak origin 
which earlier declared themselves Hungarians, but had not yet abandoned 
completely their nation and were orienting themselves towards the new 
state and nation after the collapse of the dual monarchy. 2) The departure 
from Czechoslovakia of the former civil servants oft he Monarchy coincid­
ed with this period. 3) Nor was emigration negligible, it involved more 
than 8 thousand Hungarians between 1922 and 1927. 4) The inclusion 
of the Jewish population in the census of 1930 had a more intense effect 
than in 1921. In 1928, many persons of Jewish faith (70 929 of 135 914) 
declared themselves to be of Jewish nationality. 5) The same applies to 
the gipsy population, and this reduced the number of Hungarians too. 
6) The above-mentioned difficulties of acquiring citizenship also acted in 
the direction of decrease. 7) Nor can assimilation be excluded in the terri­
tories of mixed population, mainly in the major towns (Pozsony, Kassa). 
But t his was a natural rather than artificial assimilation, or, more exactly, 
we may speak of a mingling of these phenomena.
All this is not to be construed as an excuse for the nationality policy 
of the Czechoslovak governments; the fact is that it was not possible to 
assimilate such a great mass in the given short time, let alone that there 
is no possibility for denationalizing a compact population. At the same 
time, the grave shortcomings of the nationality policy we have presented 
resulted in a furt her sharpening of the nationality hostilities.
In studying the changes of a linguistic territory, one must consider 
the birth and mortality rates. Population increase in tlie Hungarian rural 
districts between 1923 and 1936 was as follows:
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Nam e of d is tric t 1923 1924 1927 1930 1932 1936
Seniorja 18.30 13.18 1 (>.77 1 3.55 12.58
Dunaszei'dahely 15.90 17.19 12.93 12.80 12.44 10.36
Koimirom 16.95 11.31 10.20 9.59 8.21 7.25
G alanla 19.69 16.72 1.5.69 15.65 13.42 9.15
Végsellye 17.61 15.62 12.35 14.72 9.46 7.84
Ögyalla 16.7,S 12.22 12.05 12.78 14.05 9.38
Parkan j- 14.77 9.31 7.78 8.12 5.90 1.53
Zseliz 10.05 6.45 1.01 5.95 1.86 1.84
T ornalja 15.44 11.89 11.48 6.09 8.55 5.33
Szepsi 19.32 15.60 13.27 15.00 1 1.86 9.22
K irâlyhelm ec 19.86 20.91 17.42 17.40 13.75 8.96
N agykapos 18.92 1 1.69 — 14.53 14.48 10.17
Beregszàsz 22.78 17.17 13.81 17.35 13.29 8.80
Y ear Czecho­slovak U krainian G erm an Polish Jew ish
H unga- ! 
rian
1925 25.2(5 44.87 20.40 42.30 23.36 28.30
192(5 24.88 42.63 19.77 35.28 33.45 26.97
1927 23.(53 41.48 18.56 33.23 21.01 25.71
1928 23.44 43.13 18.52 31.28 22.36 25.64
1929 22.(51 41.62 17.77 30.37 21.39 24.0(5
1930 22.95 43.26 17.72 32.91 22.31 24.2(5
1931 21.20 41.34 17.33 30.84 24.35 27.37
1932 20.70 40.80 16.67 29.54 22.21 26.52
1933 19.04 36.57 15.26 25.08 20.68 23.74
1934 18.41 35.87 14.85 23.72 19.98 22.11
1935 17.40 35.60 13.80 21.30 18.50 22.06
193(5 17.18 34.57 13.69 19.81 18.63 21.56
It appears from these figures that population increase was the high­
est in 1923, and that an abrupt decrease started in 1924.
From 1926. national figures are also available and the increase in the 
Hungarian population can be compared with the similar data on the other 
nationalities of Czechoslovakia.
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This comparison shows that the birth rates of the Hungarian nation­
ality were favourable in the Czechoslovakian relation; and we may add 
that they were better than the average in Hungary.
The same cannot be said of the mortality rates:
If  we deduct the mortality rate from the birth rate, we obtain natural 
increase; and it may be termed as average:41
1 1 ANNALES -  Sectio Histoiica — Tomiis XV.
Year Czecho­slovak U krainian G erm an Polish Jew ish
H u n g a­
rian
1925 15.19 21.(50 14.09 19.35 12.14 16.31
1926 15.42 23.31 14.38 19.39 12.88 16.75
1927 15.91 24.93 14.75 18.77 12.69 16.65
1928 15.19 20.90 13.88 18.38 11.87 15.90
1929 15.41 20.51 14.85 18.16 11.86 15.4(5
1930 14.15 20.10 13.23 16.01 10.88 14.04
1931 13.95 19.96 13.88 18.80 12.88 17.42
1932 13.69 20.23 13.67 17.87 13.13 16.72
1933 13.28 15.84 13.48 16.71 12.7(5 15.84
1934 12.92 17.94 12.75 16.38 12.65 15.11
1935 13.00 17.60 13.30 15.90 13.10 15.10
1936 12.95 14.41 12.95 14.98 13.20 14.71
N ationality under th e  age o i  14. in %
under th e  age 
o f 40, in %
over th e  age 
o l 40, in %
Czechoslovak 29.46 70.96 29.04
U krainian 37.98 77.47 22.53
G erm an 26.67 67.75 32.25
Polish 33.20 74.99 25.01
Jew ish 35 .11 67.84 32.16
H ungarian 31.04 71.83 28.17
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The picture we have drawn of the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia 
was rather negative, and we have called attention to a wrong policy; yet 
we must not forget — and have hinted at this — that the bourgeois-de­
mocratic system offered certain opportunities nevertheless. Needless to 
say. a bourgeois system cannot bring a solution to this problem: it is not 
sufficient to ensure opportunities, equality on the paper, to the national­
ities which are necessarily in a disadvantageous position: they must he 
assisted, and their rights — frankly spoken — must not be curtailed as 
was the case with the Czechoslovak bourgeois democracy whenever it 
was in a position to do so. Quite the contrary, more than an equality cf 
rights ought to have been given them in order that the national minor­
ities be able to make up for their inevitable disadvantages. But was 
not the only cause why, Czechoslovakia did not become Switzerland 
where the opportunities offered by a bourgeois democracy could he ex­
ploited by the various nations also because of the fact that the economic 
level of that country was more or less uniform; Czechoslovakia could nut 
follow this course, last but not least because revanchist Germany and 
Hungary stood in the background. The inconsistent and mistaken na­
tionality policy cf this bourgeois democracy, and the fear of these states 
amplified one another.and all this was detrimental chiefly to the numerous 
Hungarian masses in Slovakia.
The difference in the economic level of the various parts of Czecho­
slovakia, the great advantage of the Czech bourgeoisie resulting from his­
torical development, prevented not only the realization of equality guaran­
teed on the paper, it also was based on the ruling position of the Czechs. 
And the economic-nationality policy hitting entire Slovakia, including the 
territories of Hungarian population, only enhanced this advantage and 
superiority further.42 And it is at this point where if we compare the 
situation of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and in the other two neigh­
bouring countries, Czechoslovakia, contrary to the other points discussed, 
appears in a less favourable light (economic oppression was of course 
practised also in Yugoslavia and Roumania, needless to say). This may 
be explained bv the fact that the Czech bourgeoisie held obviously strong­
er positions than the comparable Roumanian and Serbo-Croatian class. 
The difference between the economic strength of the Czech and the Hun­
garian ruling classes was greater in Czechoslovakia than in the other two 
countries. Retardation of the economic development in Slovakia and the
Hungarian territories had particularly grave consequences on the proleta­
rian and peasant masses. But an investigation into this question calls 
for special studies.
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op. c it. pp. 180—189.; Csatâri D.: op. cit. (R oum anian — H ungarian  Relations), pp. 
132— 160.; sam e au thor, op. cit. (In th e  W hirlw ind), pp. 21 —25. One of the fateful t r a ­
gedies o f bourgeois-dem ocratic Czechoslovakia was th e  fact th a t  it p u t a sing of equality  
betw een th e  com m unists and  th e  right-w ing H ungarian parties (This appears convinc­
ingly from the p ertinen t rich m ateria l o f th e  Slovak Central S ta te  Archive) Cf. in th is 
connection the  following archival inventories B ielik , F. — Sopko, ./.: M inister s pinou 
tnocou pre spravu  Slovenska 1919— 1927 (M inister w ith  Full Pow er for th e  Governing 
o f  Slovakia 1919—1927), B ra tislava  1964.; Sopko, J . — Barczyovât, E. — Vrbanovic, J  
Policajnć riaditePstvo v B ratislave 1920 1945 (Police D irectorate in B ratislava 1920 —
1945) . B ratislava 1961 1962. N evertheless it hardly  needs proof th a t  the Kommunist
P a r ty  o f Czechoslovakia, including qu ite  a num ber of H ungarians in Slovakia, tried  to 
defend the Republic against th e  T hird  Reich and counterrevolutionary  H ungary  th rough  
an  uncom prom ising light against na tional oppression, through guaran teeing  th e  em an­
cipation  of th e  nationalities. And th e  right-w ing H ungarian parties, in sharp  con trast 
to  th is concept ion, tried  to  crush bourgeois-dem ocratic Czechoslovakia th rough  m ain ta in ­
ing th e  policy o f grievances as th e  question o f th e  day.
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